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posing a "uniform stream of commerce,"'- the commerce
clause here, too, extends its tax immunity. The N.Y. Stock
Exchange, Chicago Grain Exchange and Chicago Stock Yards
are illustrative of the "stream of commerce" marketing sug-
gested.
In the light of the foregoing it appears that the state's
'prerequisites' are significant and useful only in those few
instances where the sale is an isolated one and marketing
conditions are such that there is no application of the "stream
of commerce" theory. The problem of state taxation and the
commerce clause remains one for which no test or rule of
thumb of uniform application may be evolved. Each situation
must be judged upon its own facts and analogies drawn with
prior cases.3 2  The solution appears to be the adoption by
Indiana of a different type of taxation"3 or affirmative fed-
eral action in this field.3 4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES
Plaintiff, a nineteen year old, was convicted of murder
in the first degree upon a plea of guilty without the advice
of counsel. The Supreme Court of Indiana held plaintiff had
31. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390 (1930); at 396,
"Dramatic circumstances, such as a great universal stream of
grain from the state of purchase to a market elsewhere, may
affect the legal conclusion by showing the manifest certainty
of the destination and exhibiting grounds of policy that are ab-
sent here." Accord, Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922);
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
32. " . . . The Indiana Gross Income Tax Division does not include
in the Regulations any specific rulings on taxability of receipts
derived from activities in interstate commerce, because of the
number and dissimilarity of situations. Therefore, each case
will be considered in the light of the individual circumstances
and the Division will determine whether or not immunity exists.
... )f CCH Ind. C. T. 10-574.
33. Freeman v. Hewit, 67 S. Ct. 274,278 (1946), suggesting the seller
state may tax; manufacturing [American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis,
250 U.S. 459 (1919)], licensing local business [Cheney Bros. Co.
v. Mass. 246 U.S. 147 (1918)], net income [U.S. Glue Co. v.
Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918)], property [Virginia v. Imperial
Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15 (1934)].
34. Inter alia; McAllister, "Court, Congress and Trade Barriers"
(1940) 16 Ind. L.J. 144; Tax Institute Symposium, ."Tax Barriers
to Trade" (1940) p. 261; Browne, "Tax Coordination" (1945) 31
Corn. L.Q. 182; Comment, "The Commerce Clause and State
Franchise Taxes Affecting Interstate Commerce" (1940) 35 Ill.
L. Rev. 441.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
waived his constitutional right to counsel.' Petition for writ
of habeas corpus in federal district court was dismissed. Held:
Affirmed. Hoelscher v. Howard, 155 F. (2d) 909 (C.C.A.
7th, 1946).
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution-
withholds from the federal courts3 in all criminal prosecutions
the power to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless
he has or waives the assistance of counsel.4
The Indiana Constitution requires that "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right ... to be heard
by himself and counsel . . . ."5 This provision has the same
effect as does the Sixth Amendment.6 It ensures the right
to be heard by counsel of one's own choice.7 It is within the
courts' inherent power to make appointment of counsel for
indigents at county expense."
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
guarantees the right to counsel in state courts., The due
1. Hoelscher v. State, 223 Ind. 62, 57 N.E.(2d) 770 (1944), cert.
denied 325 U.S. 854 (1945). Intelligent waiver is primarily a
fact for trial court, and unless upon evidence there can be rea-
sonable difference of opinion, the decision must stand. All that is
required is that accused be advised of the nature of the charge
and his right to have an attorney.
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
* .. to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
3. The Sixth Amendment applies only to federal trials, Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455,461 (1942).
4. Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1937);Wilfong v. Johnston, 156 F.(2d) 507 (C.C.A. 9th,
1946); U.S. v. Bergamo, 154 F.(2d) 31 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1946). See
Holtzoff, "The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment"
(1945) 68 N.J.L. Rev. 1, 29.
5. Art. I, §13.
6. Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63,79, 51 N.E. (2d) 848,854 (1943),
(1944) 19 Ind. L. J. 274.
7. Wilson v. State, cited supra n. 6; Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind.
69, 125 N.E. 773 (1920). .
8. State v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E. (2d) 129 (1941);
Knox County Council v. State, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.(2d) 405(1940), (1941) 16 Ind. L. J. 406; Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854).
Indiana is not in accord with the general rule that an attorney
assigned by the court to defend an indigent cannot recover com-
pensation from the public in absence of a statute. See Notes
(1941) 130 A.L.R. 1439, (1943) 144 A.L.R. 847.
9. Simultaneously with the development of an expanding concept
of a "fair trial" under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court has been developing a series of procedural Testrctions
which on some occasions and in some states puts the rights grant-
ed beyond the practical reach of the victim. Thus, the prisoner
claiming the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment must first
exhaust all state remedies before applying for consideration of
19471
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process clause does not incorporate all the provisions spe-
cifically enumerated in the first eight Amendments, nor is it
confined to these.1° Rather it guarantees those immunities
"that have been found to be implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.":" The right to counsel has been found to be
his claim in a federal court, and the impoverished and unlettered
prisoner may have an impossible time finding the right remedy.
In Indiana, no man can tell with assurance whether there is a
state remedy or not. See Note (1947) 22 Ind. L. J. 189. Pris-
oner Henry Hawk after sixteen attempts is still unable to dis-
cover a state remedy because of Nebraska's mixed up system,
Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 22 N.W.(2d) 136 (1946); Hawk v.
Olson, 66 F.Supp. 195 (D. Neb. 1946).
The most recent case is DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 67 S. Ct. 596
(1947), in which petitioner, a seventeen year old, was confronted
by a serious and complicated criminal charge and was hurried
through unfamiliar legal proceedings without a word being said
in his defense. Legal assistance never was offered or mentioned
to him, and he was not apprised of the consequences of his plea
of guilty. Held: He was deprived of rights essential to a fair
hearing under the United States Constitution.
In these criminal cases, the Supreme Court obviously has
two policies: (a) it wants to improve the administration of crim-
inal justice, raising it to high constitutional standards; (b) it
wants to give the state courts prime responsibility to improve
the local processes. Both goals can be achieved, e.g. the operation
of the New York procedure described in Canizio v. New York,
327 U.S. 82 (1946); but where state procedures are awkward,
the Court is hard forced to salvage both objectives; and in Woods
v. Neirstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1946), when compelled to choose,
it sacrificed immediate consideration of petitioner's claim in favor
of giving Illinois one more opportunity to correct its own proced-
ures.
For Indiana, Illinois, and Nebraska, at least, one may spec-
ulate that failure to provide a state system for testing claimed
constitutional rights may rapidly be followed by a decision that
there is no practical state remedy, and that hereafter state pris-
oners may proceed directly to federal court, ignoring the statejudiciary. This result is foreshadowed by the last sentence in
Woods v. Neirstheimer, supra at p. 217. The 7th Circuit Court
of Appeals has already begun to ignore the Indiana Courts, Pot-
ter v. Dowd, 146 F. (2d) 244 (1944), and Justice Murphy has re-
cently clearly revolted against state hypertechnicality, Carter v.
Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 216 (1946) (dissent). The dissenting opinion of
Black, Dougless, and Rutledge, J.J., in the same case is a sign that
their patience with ineffective state procedure is running out.
Recognizing that a real procedural crisis exists, the Indiana Ju-
dicial Council has proposed a series of rules which, if adopted,
will put Indiana into position to handle its criminal reviews in
its own courts, 1946 Report of the Judicial Council of Indiana 19.
10. See Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Louisiana v. Resweber,
67 S. Ct. 374,378 (1947) and in Malinski v. New York 324 U.S.
401,412 (1945). Justice Black has expressed the opinion that the
Bill of Rights is incorporated in the due process clause, Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455,474 (1942). For criticism of the "fair trial"
rule, see Green, "Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment: 1943-
1944" (1944) 43 Mich. L. Rev. 437,465.
11. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 19,324 (1937).
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of this fundamental nature.1 2  According to the holding in
Betts v. Brady,"1 counsel need not be appointed in every case;
however since this holding the Supreme Court has found no
other situation where counsel is not required.14 Counsel is
12. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1944); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932). Note how the court carefully limited its holding
in the Powell case, p. 71: "All that is necessary now to decide, as
we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable
to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own
defense because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, or the like, it is
the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel
for him as a necessary requisite of due process .... "
13. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), (1943) 18 Ind. L. J. 135. Petitioner had
been indicted for robbery. He was unable to employ counsel
and requested that counsel be appointed for hin. The trial judge
refused on grounds that it was not the practice in the county
to appoint counsel for indigents except in prosecution for murder
or rape. The Supreme Court affirmed denial of writ of habeas
,corpus.
The case apparently anewsred in the negative the unanswered
question in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), cited supra n.
12, as to whether in every case one charged with crime must be
furnished counsel by the state.
14. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) has been cited in recent
Supreme Court cases prefixed by "See" or "Cf." or has been ig-
nored completely. However, the case has been given some ef-
ficacy in the lower federal courts: Mayo v'. Wade, 158 F.(2d)
614 (C.C.A. 5th, 1946); Flansburg-v. Kaiser, 55 F.Supp. 959(W.D. Mo. 1944); Ex parte Williams, 54 F.Supp. 924 (E.D.
Ill. 1943); see U.S. v. Ragen, 60 F.Supp. 821 (E.D. Ill. 1945).
Betts v. Brady will continue to exist in our law so long as these
federal courts continue to apply it since most petitioners' rights
will be determined at this level. These cases and the principal
case noted herein, Hoeschler v. Howard, 155 F.(2d) 909 (C.C.A.
7th, 1946), attempt to distinguish such cases as Williams v. Kai-
ser, 323 U.S. 471 (1944) and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932), on the ground that in Betts v. Brady, Maryland had no
statute requiring appointment of counsel, while in the other cases
the state law also was violated by the failure to appoint counsel.
The majority opinion in Betts v. Brady, pp. 464,465, mentions the
fact that in previous cases the state law had required appoint-
ment of counsel; however, no emphasis is given to this fact, and
main emphasis for the decision lies in the difference in the ma-
nitude of the charges and that petitioner had here "obviously"
committed the crime, see p. 473. It would not seem that an im-
portant federal constitutional right should be protected only when
the state also recognizes the same right as a state right. It is
even more important to guarantee a fair trial under the Four-
teenth Amendment where state rights are not adequate. The only
possible effect state substantive law should have on a federal
right might be the determination by "wager of law" whether or
not the particular provision is necessary to fundamental justice
so as to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment. But see Ap-
pendix to Betts v. Brady, at p. 477, for the various state laws on
this subject.
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required for crimes less than murder.' 5 Even a defendant
who pleads guilty is entitled to benefit of counsel.'- A request
for counsel is not necessary. 7 Accused is entitled to a rea-
sonable opportunity to consult with counsel of his own
choice,' and the duty to appoint counsel is not discharged by
an assignment under circumstances that preclude the giving
of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.-
Accused is entitled to counsel at all stages of the trial.20
Nevertheless, the right to counsel may be waived. 2 It is
necessary, however, to determine under the circumstances
of each particular case whether the accused was competent
to exercise an intelligent judgment.2  Defendant must of
course be aware of his right to counsel before he can effec-
tively waive." Although not conclusive, factors which may be
considered in determining waiver are: that accused is himself
a lawyer,'24 has had previous experience in the courts,'25 or'was
advised by counsel to waive. 6 A plea of guilty or the ab-
sence of a request for counsel is not an implied waiver of
15. Burglary: Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); House v. Mayo,
324 U.S. 42 (1945). Robbery: compare Williams v. Kaiser, 323
U.S. 471 (1945), with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Ob-
taining money in a con game: White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
16. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945).
17. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323
U.S. 485 (1945).
18. House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
19. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945) (counsel appointed did not
confer with petitioner until they came into court for trial, counsel
was too busy to call witnesses); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444
(1940) (refusal to grant continuance under the circumstances
did not deny to petitioner a fair trial); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932) (all the members of the bar had been appointed
to defend and until a few minutes before trial, no specific person
was charged with the responsibility).
20. Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) (between plea of not guilty
and calling of jury); Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F.Supp. 774 (N.D.
Calif. 1943) (at arraignment).
21. Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,277 (1942); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937). For waiver of jury trial, see
Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 277 (1930).
22. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1937); Williams v. Huff, 142
F.(2d)_91 (App. D.C. 1944).
23. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
24. Glasser v. U.S. 315 U.S. 60 (1941).
25. Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
26. Id. at p. 277.
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the right.27 The fact that the trial judge appointed counsel
at the sentencing stage does not show that accused was not
competent to waive counsel at other stages of the proceed-
ings.25
On appeal, every reasonable presumption should be
against waiver of such an important constitutional right.2
If waiver is to be permitted3 ° it should at least appear
affirmatively in the record that accused was informed of his
right to counsel and intelligently choose to waive it.2' This
should make trial judges more conscientious in informing
accused of their rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUPPRESSION OF COERCED CONFESSIONS
Appellants were arrested by F.B.I. agents for the illegal
possession of stolen goods and confessions were obtained. Al-
leging the confessions to have been illegally obtained," ap-
pellants, prior to indictment, petitioned the district court
to suppress them and to restrain the United States Attorney
from using them as evidence. The district judge, without
27. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945). At least whatever inference
can be drawn is answered by allegation of no waiver. Question
of fact arises.
28. Cartes v. Illinois, 67 S.Ct. 216 (1946).
29. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,468 (1937). A conflict of pre-
sumptions arises. Which should prevail, every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver of important constitutional rights or pre-
sumption of regularity of judgment of a court when collaterally
attacked by habeas corpus?
30. See Douglas, Murphy, and Black, J.J. dissenting in Adams v. U.S.
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,282 (1942). Query under this view
if counsel could ever be waived at all.
31. See Justice Murphy dissenting in Carter v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 216,
222 (1946). Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,465 (1937) (though
not necessary it would be fitting and proper).
See Rules of the Indiana Supreme Court, Rule 1-11, Novem-
ber 6, 1946. With a plea of guilty in felony cases, the judge
shall cause a record to be made of the entire proceedings in con-
nection with arraignment and sentencing.
There is a possibility that the affirmative statement might
become a mere formal matter of record.
1. Appellants alleged the confessions were obtained by threats of
physical violence and other coercive measures. Appellants also
contended that search of a rubber cement plant and seizure of
certain documents were conducted under a warrant unlawfully
issued. However, the district judge found that the search and
seizure was conducted with the written consent of the appellants
voluntarily given. This ruling was affirmed in the principal case.
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